Security hardening
This page explains Falak’s security model and what you should do on top of the defaults.
What Falak does by default
Section titled “What Falak does by default”Control plane
Section titled “Control plane”- TLS everywhere: Let’s Encrypt for the panel, HSTS (
max-age=31536000), the agent API on its own host with mutual TLS against Falak’s Fleet CA. - Secrets (site variables, the secret store, git and provider credentials, database passwords, DNS tokens, GitHub App keys, two-factor secrets) are encrypted with AES-256-GCM under data keys wrapped by the key-encryption key (see Encryption keys), and never sent to the UI unless explicitly revealed. Reveals need a recent re-authentication and are audited.
- Session, CSRF and remember-me cookies are
__Host-prefixed (host-only,Secure,Path=/) whenever the panel runs on HTTPS, so a site on a sibling subdomain (a preview, say) can’t plant cookies the panel would read. /opt/falak/.envis mode 600;backups/is mode 700.- Containers run with
no-new-privileges. The app trusts proxy headers only from the edge subnet (FALAK_EDGE_SUBNET). - Outbound requests the control plane makes on users’ behalf are guarded: alert webhooks, backup storage endpoints and template URL imports refuse private, loopback and link-local addresses by default.
Servers
Section titled “Servers”- The agent dials out; it listens only on loopback (OTLP) and a unix socket.
- Firewall: nftables, inbound drop by default; only SSH, plus 80/443 on servers that serve HTTP.
- SSH: keys only (
PasswordAuthentication no,PermitRootLogin prohibit-password,MaxAuthTries 4),fail2banrunning, unattended security upgrades on. - The
falakuser has no sudo. Sites can run as isolated Linux users. - Release and
shared/directories are mode 0750 with an ACL for the edge only; other local users cannot readbootstrap/cache/config.php. Site.envfiles live on a tmpfs, never on persistent disk, and secret values are masked in deploy, hook and build output. - The edge’s Caddy admin API listens on a root-only unix socket, never a TCP port.
- Database containers run pinned image digests, get passwords as files and publish ports only to their consumers.
- Deploys verify downloaded runtimes and agent binaries by SHA-256.
- Compose files are checked against a policy (no privileged containers, host namespaces, extra capabilities, host mounts, devices or Docker socket) unless an admin allows privileged Compose.
Encryption keys
Section titled “Encryption keys”Every secret Falak stores is encrypted at rest with AES-256-GCM under a data key. Data keys are stored in the database, wrapped by the key-encryption key (KEK). The KEK is not APP_KEY and is never in .env or the database, so a copy of the database together with .env reveals no secrets. Each value is bound to its row: copied elsewhere, it no longer decrypts.
- Where.
/opt/falak/secrets/kek: 32 random bytes, mode0400, mounted read-only into the PHP containers only. They refuse to start without a usable KEK.falak-ctl kek statusandfalak-ctl doctorcheck it. - Emergency kit. Right after installing, and after every rotation:
falak-ctl kek export /root/falak-emergency-kit.txt, move the file to a password manager or offline storage, and delete it from the host.falak-ctl kek import <file>puts the KEK back. - Rotation.
falak-ctl kek rotatecreates a new KEK, keeps the old one assecrets/kek.previous(older backups need it) and re-wraps every data key; the secrets themselves are not re-encrypted. - KMS / Vault. Set
FALAK_KEK_PROVIDER=aws-kmsorvault-transitin.envto keep the KEK in AWS KMS or a Vault/OpenBao transit key, where it never leaves; the provider’s settings go incustom.env. - Backups. A control plane backup contains the KEK only when it is encrypted with the DR passphrase. See Back up and restore Falak.
Hardening checklist
Section titled “Hardening checklist”| Action | |
|---|---|
| ☐ | Restrict sign-up. By default anyone who can reach the panel can create an account (with its own empty organization; it cannot see yours). On a public panel, set FALAK_REGISTRATION=invite (sign-up only through an invitation link) or closed (accounts only via falak-ctl admin create) in /opt/falak/.env, then falak-ctl up. See Who can sign up. |
| ☐ | Turn on two-factor authentication for every member (per user; not enforceable per organization yet). |
| ☐ | Give members the lowest role that works. recipes.run, terminal.*, fleet.agents.manage and sites.compose.policy are admin-only because they amount to root on your servers. |
| ☐ | Create scoped API tokens with expiry for CI and agents, never * tokens for automation. |
| ☐ | Save the emergency kit (falak-ctl kek export) off the host, and set up disaster recovery (falak-ctl dr setup): encrypted, scheduled backups in a bucket of their own. |
| ☐ | Check each server’s security baseline and apply the safe fixes. |
| ☐ | Restrict Grafana to operators: dashboards are not filtered per organization inside Grafana. |
| ☐ | Keep database public access off; when you need it, list only the sources that need it. See Remote access. |
| ☐ | Use your own domains in production, not shared sslip.io names (no cookie isolation between their users). |
| ☐ | Keep Allow privileged compose off unless you trust everyone who can create sites. |
| ☐ | Protect staging with basic auth or IP allow lists (routing rules). |
| ☐ | Limit SSH on servers to your IPs with a firewall rule if possible (the SSH port itself always stays open to avoid lock-out). |
| ☐ | Bind the panel to one address with FALAK_BIND if the host has several interfaces. |
| ☐ | Configure mail so password resets and alerts work. |
| ☐ | Watch the Audit log (audit.view). |
Known limits
Section titled “Known limits”- The alert webhook SSRF guard checks the host but does not resolve DNS, so DNS rebinding is not blocked.
- Deleting an organization revokes its agents but does not destroy provider machines.
- Octane’s FrankenPHP server binds its port on all interfaces; the default-drop firewall blocks it from outside.